Inhaltsverzeichnis:1. Introduction
I. Political Economy in Open Economies2. National Policies in International Markets
2.1. Policy Interdependence
2.2. International Cooperation and Welfare Maximizing Politicians
2.3. Time Consistency and Credibility: International Competition as a Commitment Device
2.4. Biased Politicians: Cooperation as a Means of Collusion
2.5. Enforcement and Institutions: The Role of International Organizations
2.6. Domestic Institutions and International Policy
2.7. Conclusion and Outlook
3. Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device - A Probabilistic Voting Model of Sovereign Debt
3.1. Introduction
3.2. The Model
3.2.1. Market Structure
3.2.2. Political Structure - Probabilistic Voting
3.3. Positive Analysis
3.4. Normative Implications
3.5. Conclusion
3.6. Appendix
4. The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights in Open Economies
4.1. Introduction
4.2. The Issue and Related Literature
4.3. The Model in a Closed Economy
4.4. The Model in an Open Economy
4.4.1. World Social Planner
4.4.2. Non-Cooperative Solution
4.4.3. Comparison between the Global Welfare Maximizing Allocation and the Interior Nash-Equilibrium
4.5. Trade Policy and Policy of Intellectual Property Rights
4.6. Conclusion
4.7. Appendix
II. Models of Ineffcient Economic Policies5. Rent Seeking, Lobbying and Special Interest Group Politics
5.1. Lobbying
5.2. Rent Seeking and Contest Success Functions
5.3. Game Theoretic Models of Rent Seeking
5.4. A Model of Delegation in Contests
5.5. Some Empirical Evidence on the Costs of Rent Seeking
6. Rent Seeking and Electoral Accountability
6.1. Introduction
6.2. Related literature
6.3. The Model
6.4. Two Asymmetric Rent Seeking Groups
6.4.1. The Rent as a Private Good
6.4.2. The Rent as a Group Specific Public Good
6.5. n Symmetric Groups
6.5.1. The Rent as a Private Good
6.5.2. The Rent as a Group Specific Public Good
6.6. Conclusion
6.7. Appendix
7. References
Mobil →
↑ http://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5082/1/Brandauer_Stefan.pdf